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ToRTs-MENTAL DisTRESs-REcovERY AGAINST ORIGINAL WRONGDOER FOR
FEAR OF CANCER CAUSED BY SUBSEQUENT MEDICAL ADVICE-Plaintiff, suffering
from bursitis in the right shoulder, received X-ray treatments from defendant physicians. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff's shoulder began to itch,
scab, and blister for several years, a condition diagnosed as chronic radiodermatitis caused by the X-ray therapy. Approximately two years after the
treatments, plaintiff was examined by a dermatologist who advised her
to have her shoulder checked every six months because the area might become cancerous. Plaintiff then developed a severe "cancerphobia," an apprehension that she would ultimately develop cancer from the radiation
burn. Plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against defendant physicians,
seeking recovery for the physical injury and the mental distress caused by
her later-developed fear of cancer. The trial court gave judgment for
plaintiff and the appellate division affirmed. On appeal, held, affirmed,
three judges dissenting in part. Plaintiff can recover for the mental suffering which resulted from information she received from a third party to
whom she had gone for treatment of the original physical injury. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. (2d) 16, 152 N.E. (2d) 249 (1958).
When a defendant's negligence inflicts an immediate physical injury,
litigants have been allowed compensation for the accompanying mental
distress. If the physical harm is not immediate but follows subsequently
as a result of plaintiff's fright or shock, there is a division of authority.
Some courts have granted a recovery for such consequences only if there has
been some physical "impact" on the plaintiff's person, while a growing
number of courts allow recovery without considering "impact." When defendant's negligence causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, there is general agreement denying recovery, with
certain exceptions as in the case of negligent mishandling of a corpse.
The courts recognize intentional inflection of mental distress as a separate
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tort.1 The plaintiff in the principal case sought recovery for her anxiety
and worry over the possibility of contracting cancer.2 The elements of
impact, physical injury, and accompanying pain and suffering were present.
The decision, however, represents the first case in New York to allow recovery from the defendant for mental suffering arising from information
the plaintiff received from a doctor to whom she later went for treatment of the original physical injury caused by the defendant.3 On facts
quite similar to those in the principal case, a Vermont court has allowed
recovery,4 and in circumstances somewhat different a Texas court has
approved recovery of damages for mental distress.5 In allowing recovery
the court in the principal case faced two problems: proximate cause and
proof. The first problem, proximate cause, seems a relatively simple one.6
While in the principal case the mental anguish did not arise for two years,

1 See generally on mental distress PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 38-47, 178-182 (1955); 1
HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 665-691 (1956); McCORMICK, DAMAGES 299-334 (1935); 1 STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 460-471 (1906); 25 C.J.S. 548-560 (1941); 15 AM. JUR.,
Damages §§175-189 (1938); Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort,'' 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939); Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage,"
20 MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Plant, "Damages for Pain and Suffering," 19 Omo ST. L. J.
200 (1958); Zelermyer, "Damages for Pain and Suffering," 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 27 (1954);
McNiece, "Psychic Injury and Tort Liability In New York," 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1 (1949);
Harper and McNeely, "A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426; Magruder, ".Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts,'' 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Throckmorton, "Damages for Fright," 34 HARV.
L. REv. 260 (1921); Burdick, "Tort Liability for Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock,"
5 COL. L. REv. 179 (1905).
2 Recovery has generally been allowed for anxiety over complications from present
physical injury. See Smith v. Boston and Maine R.R., 87 N.H. 246, 177 A. 729 (1935)
(fear of paralysis); Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 74 S. 998 (1917) (fear
of hydrophobia following dog bite); Walker v. Boston and Maine R.R., 71 N.H. 271,
51 A. 918 (1902) (fear of insanity); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52
S.E. 152 (1905) (fear of death); Fink v. Dixon, 46 Wash. (2d) 794, 285 P. (2d) 557 (1955)
(plaintiff, pregnant woman, physically injured ,by defendant, worried about effects on
herself and her baby).
3 See principal case at 252. However, the original tortfeasor has been held liable for
further physical injuries suffered by plaintiff because of the negligence of the attending
physician. See Primes v. Ross, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 702 (1953); Sauter v. New York Central
and Hudson River R. Co., 66 N.Y. 50 (1876).
4 Halloran v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 A. 143
(1921), in which defendant's negligently-inflicted injury prevented plaintiff from having
a necessary operation. When plaintiff learned this from her physician and suffered great
mental anxiety, she was allowed to recover.
5 See Kimbell v. Noel, (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 228 S.W. (2d) 980, in which defendant's
negligence caused a breast injury to plaintiff, with a resulting possibility of cancer. The
court recognized the right to recover for mental anguish. However, in this case there
was a subsequent physical harm to plaintiff, an exploratory operation to remove what
was believed to be a malignancy.
6See Milks v. Mdver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934), which states the New York
rule on proximate cause to be that the original wrongdoer is liable even for an increase
in damages caused by subsequent medical treatment. This rule was deemed controlling
in the principal case.
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it is nevertheless reasonable for one suffering from a severe X-ray bum
to see a physician. The advice of the dermatologist to watch for possible
cancer and plaintiff's subsequent anxiety also seem foreseeable if not inevitable. Any defense the defendant might raise that the dermatologist
here was an insulating intervening cause fails, once it is recognized that
plaintiff acted foreseeably in going to the dermatologist. The second
problem, proof, is much more serious and is complicated by the possible
flood of litigation, both spurious and valid, which might accompany this
decision. The court recognized the problem,7 but endorsed "public policy
and common sense" as the ultimate limitation on recovery. 8 The opinion
indicates a confidence in the court's ability to distinguish valid and spurious
claims, and an attitude that the possibility of false claims should not negate
recovery in valid cases.9 Though there has been disagreement over the
reliability of evidence admitted to prove mental distress,1° the contemporary medical position is that mental distress is rarely unaccompanied
by physical reaction, and physical injury seldom not attended with mental
distress.11 Although it follows therefore that mental distress can be substantiated by evidence of physical injury or reaction, which is much easier
to prove thari mental suffering, it is not universally agreed that all problems of proof are now solved for purposes of litigation.12 Nevertheless
courts today accept in increasing number previously spurned medical
opinion, such as the concurrent physical injury-mental distress thesis,
and doctors are demonstrating a greater willingness to testify in litigations.
These factors, coupled with the limitation provided by "public policy and

7 See principal case at 252: "Mental disturbance is easily simulated, and courts which
are plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims may well be unwilling to open the
door to an even more dubious field" [quoting from PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 212-213 (1955)].
8 See principal case at 253. Although the court split 4-3, objective analysis of the
mind is the turning point in many areas of the law: e.g., malicious prosecution, libel,
slander, assault, alienation of affections, fraud cases in proving scienter.
9 The court's quick dismissal of the problem of spurious claims (and the complementary problem of a flood of litigation) is not without justification. Similar worries
in granting recoveries in novel fact situations have proved unfounded. Thus, following
a hesitant grant of recovery for shock for the •first time, L. J. Atkin in Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros., I K.B. 141 (1925), said at 158: "I find only about half-a-dozen cases of direct shock
reported in about thirty years." See also Gulf Ry. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944
(1900).
10 Representing contrary opinions, see Lake Erie and Western R. Co. v. Johnson,
191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922), and PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 38 (1955).
11 ELDREDGE, -MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 76 (1941). See also PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 177
(1955).
12 See McNiece, "Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York," 24 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 1 at 74-75 (1949): "With the possible exception of a few standardized psychometric
tests of intelligence and broad personality categories and the electroencephalograph useful
in epilepsy cases, there are no reliable objective guides.'' -Moreover, it is not difficult
for both parties to the complaint to get medical testimony reaching diametrically opposed conclusions.
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common sense,"13 provide a stronger foundation for court decisions. The
court then appears to be on firm ground in rejecting the arguments concerning difficulty of proof. The result agrees with current trends to
recognize mental distress alone as an actionable injury,14 and the diminution of the requirement of physical impact for recovery in several states. 15
The liberal approach of the court, in rejecting objections proved largely untenable in the past and in recognizing advanced medical knowledge
particularly in the field of psychiatry, is refreshing and reasonable. The
right to peace of mind is fast becoming a well-protected interest in our
courts today.
Paul Gerding

13 See

note 8 supra.
See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 38 (1955). See also Farage, "Mental Distress as an
Independent Basis for Recovery," 40 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1935).
15 See ELDREDGE, MonERN TORT PROBLEMS 72-73 (1941). See also Harper and McNeely,
"A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 WIS. L. REv.
426.
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